Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State Sovereignty by Warren, T. Camber
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2014-01
Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power,
Mass Media, and the Production of
State Sovereignty
Warren, T. Camber
þÿ I n t e r n a t i o n a l   O r g a n i z a t i o n ,   V o l .   6 8 ,   W i n t e r   2 0 1 4 ,   p p .   1 1 1  4 1
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/46667
 Not by the Sword Alone: 
 
Soft Power, Mass Media,  







T. Camber Warren 
 
 
Department of Defense Analysis 














Scholars of civil conflict have long recognized the importance of state strength in the suppression of nascent 
insurgencies.  However, previous empirical investigations have generally focused on the material and coercive 
dimensions of state power, obscuring the critical role played by the generation of widespread voluntary 
compliance with state dictates, i.e. the production of soft power.  In contrast, in this paper I focus on a factor – 
mass communication technology – that can only enhance state capacity by strengthening the state's ability to 
broadly and publicly disseminate political messages.  Utilizing newly compiled cross-national data on mass 
media accessibility in the post-World War II period, I show that the enhanced capacities for large-scale 
normative influence provided by mass communication technologies generate substantial barriers to the 
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 Few concepts have been more fundamental to the contemporary literature on civil 
conflict than the role of "state strength" in the production of stable, sovereign polities.
1
  Indeed, a 
central point of consensus in modern conflict studies is that challenges to state sovereignty are 
more likely to arise in political contexts characterized by "state weakness."
2
  While such conflicts 
are characterized by diverse historical legacies, the observation of large-scale violence between 
state and insurgent forces represents, at the very least, a clear sign that a state's influence has 
failed to reach significant portions of the population and territory it claims to govern.
3
  
Insurgency, rebellion, and other forms of collective anti-state violence are thus generally 
characterized as forms of political action that reflect fundamental weaknesses in a state’s ability 
to buy off or coerce would-be challengers.
4
   
While this work has revealed many of the foundational mechanisms underlying the 
production of civil warfare, in this paper I will argue that much of the literature on insurgent 
mobilization and suppression has been characterized by an overly narrow approach to the 
concept of state strength, which has focused almost exclusively on elements of so-called "hard 
power." In particular, the empirical operationalizations of state strength utilized in the 
quantitative literature on civil war have generally relied on measures of economic advancement, 
such as GDP per capita, as proxies for state effectiveness.   Different causal interpretations have 
been attached to such findings, with some authors focusing on the utilization of these material 
resources as "sticks" to coerce compliance, and with others focusing on their utilization as 
"carrots" to purchase compliance.  However, within the confines of this debate, an important 
                                                 
1 See Hendrix 2010 for a review. 
2 Sobek 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004. 
3 Kalyvas 2006; Tilly 2003. 
4 Fjelde and De Soysa 2009. 
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point has been missed: states do not rely exclusively on carrots and sticks to suppress the 
mobilization of nascent insurgencies.  They also rely on emotionally charged messages to induce 
voluntary compliance with state rule. That is, state capacity is premised – at least in part – on the 
normative power of communication. 
In making this argument for the importance of normative influence — i.e. soft power — 
in the context of militarized challenges to state sovereignty, I draw both on theorists of 
international politics who have critiqued the field’s tendency to equate state power with material 
power,
5
 and on theorists of modern nationalism, who have highlighted the crucial role played by 
mass communication technologies in the production of unified and stable polities.
6
 These authors 
correctly note that while force and wealth have always been vital tools of state-building, modern 
states are also built upon a foundation of symbolic capacities: technologies which enable leaders 
to more effectively communicate normative demands for state loyalty and national unity, and 
thereby to more reliably suppress the emergence of militarized challengers.   
Central to this account are mass media technologies that allow political elites to broadly 
and publicly disseminate political messages to their citizenry; messages which consist of images, 
narratives, and other symbols designed to characterize state authority as beneficial and just, 
thereby inducing voluntary compliance with state dictates.  I argue that strong mass media 
infrastructures dramatically lower the production cost of such normative influence, while at the 
same time generating powerful economies of scale in the development of political loyalties.  As a 
result, strong mass media systems should be expected to produce substantial barriers to the 
mobilization of insurgent forces challenging the state's rule.  
                                                 
5 Nye 1990, 2004; Wendt 1999; Lake 2009. 
6 Deutsch 1953; Anderson 1991.  
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In other words, I argue that the mechanisms available to states for producing stability and 
sovereignty are not exhausted by the material tools of force and wealth.  Utilizing newly 
compiled global data on mass media accessibility in the post-World War II period, I show that 
this second face of state power — soft power — is a crucial component of state influence and 
control, even in the life-or-death context of insurgent warfare.  Contrary to much of the 
conventional wisdom in the field, this statistical evidence demonstrates that mass media 
infrastructure represents one of the most powerful forces for peace and stability yet observed in 
the modern world, producing more than a tenfold decrease in a country’s likelihood of 
experiencing the onset of civil war.  Moreover, through a combination of standard regression 
analysis, non-parametric tests of predictive accuracy, Bayesian model averaging, and optimized 
matching estimators, I show that the pacifying effect of mass media technology cannot be 
attributed to material capacities, economic development, or social modernization, and in fact is 
one of the most robust relationships yet identified in the quantitative literature on civil conflict.  
By demonstrating the uniquely powerful effects of a factor which can only enhance a state’s 
strength by increasing its ability to communicate broadly, I seek to provide new evidence for the 
fundamental importance of non-material state capacities; evidence, that is, for a form of state 
influence which arises not through the dissemination of dollars or bullets, but through the 




Existing Approaches to State Strength 
Many have recognized the importance of state capacity in understanding the emergence 
of armed conflict between states and non-state actors.
7
  While the approaches to conceptualizing 
state strength have varied widely, most treatments in the quantitative literature on civil conflict 
have tended to rely on measures of economic development (i.e. GDP per capita).
8
  Fearon and 
Laitin in particular have argued that GDP per capita is negatively related to the probability of 
civil war onset because it serves as a useful proxy of a state’s capacity to project coercive force.9  
States with greater levels of material resources, they argue, can use their military leverage to 
deter the mobilization of insurgent forces, and to field more effective counter-insurgency 
campaigns.  This focus on coercive force as the locus of state strength is reflective of a central 
tradition in international relations scholarship,
10
 which highlights the use of material resources to 
achieve an internal monopoly on the deployment of collective violence, suppressing the 
emergence of domestic security dilemmas by increasing the expected costs of rebellion.  It is also 
reflective of a major strand of work in political sociology,
11
 which highlights the importance of 
coercive instruments of surveillance, deterrence, and outright force in the development of 
effective state institutions. 
In contrast, Collier and Hoeffler have claimed that GDP per capita is actually capturing, 
not coercive capacities, but rather the economic capacity to compete for the labor of rebel 
recruits.
12
  Their argument thus mirrors the cost-benefit logic above, but reverses its direction: 
rather than preventing conflict by increasing the costs of rebellion, material resources are said to 
                                                 
7 Benson and Kugler 1998; Buhaug 2006; Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2009; Gleditsch 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fjelde and De Soysa 2009; 
Hendrix 2010; Lacina 2006; Thies 2010. 
8 One important exception is the work that has developed around Arbetman and Kugler's 1998 alternative measures of state fiscal capacities.  See 
for instance, Fjelde and De Soysa 2009 and Thies 2010. 
9 Fearon and Laitin 2003. 
10 Posen 1993; Kaufman 1996; Fearon 2008. 
11 Herbst 2000; 2004; Tilly 1992; 2003.  For a trenchant analysis of the dynamics of state coercive repression, see also Davenport 2007a; 2007b. 
12 Collier and Hoeffler 2004. 
5 
 
prevent conflict by increasing the benefits of the alternatives to rebellion. This focus on the use 
of material resources to purchase internal peace follows in the footsteps of a large body of work 
in international relations and comparative politics, which emphasizes the provision of goods by 
the state to gain support from politically relevant communities.
13
 Thus, while some portions of 
the field have focused on the state's provision of "bads" (i.e. sanctions), and others have focused 
on the state's provision of "goods" (i.e. inducements), the conceptualizations of state power 
which have underpinned our quantitative analyses have generally been limited to mechanisms 
rooted in the deployment of material capacities.
14
  
While a number of important insights have been gained through these approaches, such 
attempts to quantify state capacity have also faced two key difficulties.  First, the reliance on 
aggregate measures of economic advancement creates a problem of observational equivalence 
between the mechanisms proposed in the literature.  The negative relationship between GDP per 
capita and civil conflict could represent state success in coercing compliance just as easily as it 
could represent state success in purchasing compliance, or any number of alternative 
mechanisms.  Thus, while such measures can tell us that state capacity is important, they cannot 
tell us how state capacity operates.  Second, and more fundamentally, I will argue that previous 
attempts to quantify state capacity have been rooted in an overly narrow conceptualization of the 
mechanisms of political influence, a conceptualization which assumes that a state’s power is 
equivalent to its material power.   
Let us define political power quite simply as the capacity to influence the actions of 
others; that is, the capacity to produce behaviors in others that would not otherwise have been 
                                                 
13 Azam 1995; 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Buhaug 2006; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006. 
14 An important exception to this trend is recent work by Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød 2008 and Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, examining 





  State strength, in the sense intended here, is then simply a state's capacity to 
influence the behavior of individuals or groups, most basically by preventing their use of 
violence against the state and against each other.
16
  In pursuing this most fundamental of goals, it 
is quite obvious that one of the most basic tools available to states is the use of material resources 
to manipulate the expected costs and benefits of particular political actions, especially to raise 
the costs and lower the benefits of collective violence.  However, we would do well to remember 
the admonition of Barnett and Duvall, that "scholars should be attentive to a range of 
technologies and mechanisms as they consider how one actor is able to directly control the 
conditions of behavior of another actor."
17
  In fact, the mechanisms of state power are not 
exhausted by the creation of material costs and material benefits.  State influence is exercised, 
not only through the deployment of force ("sticks") and wealth ("carrots"), but also through the 
deployment of symbols.   
 It is this fundamental immateriality of modern state power which lies at the root of 
Joseph Nye's famous division between "hard power" and "soft power" in the realm of 
international politics.
18
  According to Nye, the co-optive influence of soft power is 
fundamentally rooted in the generation of "attraction"; a form of normative influence, which is 
conceptually quite distinct from the application of coercion or payments.
19
 Rather than relying on 
costs and benefits, soft power is derived from an agent's ability to lead others to "develop 
                                                 
15 Lukes 1974; 2005; Baldwin 1985. 
16 Weber 1948; Waltz 1979. 
17 Barnett and Duvall 2005, 50. 
18 Nye 1990; 2004. 
19 Nye 2004, 5. 
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preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own."
20
  It is, in other words, the 
capacity to make others "want what you want."
21
   
 This basic distinction between the materiality of "hard power" and the immateriality of 
"soft power" has a long history in the study of international relations.  Indeed, it can be traced at 
least as far back as E.H. Carr, who argued for a similar distinction between "propaganda power", 
which is derived from the normative opinions of mass publics, as opposed to "military power" 
and "economic power", which are derived from the deployment of violent and non-violent 
sanctions.
22
  It is also a close relative of what Steven Lukes has called the "third dimension" of 
power: the ability to secure the compliance of others by shaping their values, preferences, and 
beliefs.
23
  In this sense, Nye's argument is rooted in the constructivist distinction between a 
"logic of consequences," in which behaviors are chosen according to their expected costs and 
benefits, and a "logic of appropriateness," in which behaviors are chosen according to their 
perceived rightfulness and legitimacy.
24
   
 Although they have utilized different terminologies, each of these thinkers recognized 
that citizens do not comply with state dictates merely because they fear the consequences of 
disobedience.  They also comply because they believe that disobedience is wrong, and believe 
that many others join them in this feeling.  There is thus enormous political influence to be 
achieved through the manipulation of normative ideas.  As Keohane and Goldstein argued, to 
exercise influence over such ideas is to exercise influence over the "road maps" that guide actors 
                                                 
20 Nye 1990, 168. 
21 Nye 1990, 167. 
22 Carr 1964. 
23 Lukes 1974; 2005. 
24 March and Olson 1998. 
8 
 
towards particular definitions of right and wrong.
25
  Influence, in other words, over what counts 
in the normative evaluation of behavior.
26
 
 As a result, the competitive dynamics surrounding the emergence of challenges to state 
sovereignty cannot be reduced to the operation of material forces alone.  Recall that Max 
Weber's oft-cited definition of state sovereignty referred to the achievement, not of a monopoly 
on the use of force, but a monopoly on the "legitimate" use of force.
27
  Weber recognized that 
while no state would ever quash all instances of internal violence, successful states could 
facilitate the production of collective values that would render physical aggression against state 
forces unacceptable to large portions of the population, and thus limit the scope of any attempts 
to fuel the eruption of anti-state violence. In other words, those living under the auspices of 
successful states refrain from challenges to state sovereignty because their social roles have been 
constituted in a symbolic environment which effectively characterizes political violence as 
normatively unacceptable.
28
   
 This analysis parallels Krasner's distinction between mechanisms of "control,"  those 
limited forms of influence which can be produced through the application of brute force; and 
mechanisms of "authority," which achieve greater compliance at lower cost through the 
generation of "legitimacy."
29
  According to this view of state power, legitimacy represents a non-
material form of state capacity, which arises when states succeed in inculcating in their citizens a 
                                                 
25 Keohane and Goldstein 1993. 
26 Keck and Sikkink 1998, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999. 
27 Weber 1948, 78. 
28 Adler and Barnett 1998; Wendt 1999. 
29 Krasner 1999. 
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"mutually recognized right" to demand popular compliance with state dictates.
30
  In David Lake's 
apt terms: 
"Legitimacy is the bridge between compulsion and choice, the alchemist’s  dross 




 In other words, Mao was wrong to claim that political power stems exclusively from the 
"barrel of a gun."  Rather, the legitimacy of appeals to state loyalty must be spoken into 
existence, on the basis of images, narratives, and other symbols that at least some portion of the 
population are willing to accept as valid interpretations of their lived realties.  It is through this 
'alchemy' that political communication produces, maintains, and transforms prevailing visions of 
the political regime and the political community.  As Rogers Smith argues, such messages 
"work essentially as persuasive historical stories that prompt people to embrace 
the valorized identities, play the stirring roles, and have fulfilling experiences that 
political leaders strive to evoke for them, whether through arguments, rhetoric, 




Indeed, this seems to be the defining feature of soft power: due precisely to its inherently 
immaterial character, soft power can only be exercised through mechanisms of communication.  
That is, soft power can only arise when a particular pattern of political communication causes it 
to be felt. 
 Herein, then, lies the fundamental difficulty facing researchers who would subject this 
second face of state power to quantitative empirical scrutiny: because it originates in the 
emotional content of diverse political messages, the operations of soft power are inherently 
difficult to observe and quantify on a global basis.  However, in the following section I argue 
that such difficulties need not lead us to abandon the pursuit of systematic, global research on the 
                                                 
30 Krasner 1999, 10.  See also Levi 1988; 2006, describing effective state rule as the production of "quasi-voluntary compliance."  For a review of 
the literature surrounding the concept of legitimacy in international relations, see Hurd 1999. 
31 Lake 2009, 333. 
32 Smith 2003, 44-45. 
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effects of soft power.  Rather, we can study the effects of political ideas by measuring variation 
in the conditions of their production and dissemination, especially those provided by modern 
technologies of mass communication.  In other words, I will argue that we can move forward 
effectively, by applying a structural empirical approach to constructivist theoretical concepts. 
 
Mass Communication and the Mass Production of Political Loyalties 
 The theoretical linkage between technologies of mass communication and the production 
of state loyalty has a long history in the sociological literature on the development of nationalism 
in modern Europe.  One of the most prominent descriptions of this relationship was given by 
Deutsch, who famously claimed that boundaries between national communities were defined 
first and foremost by "relative barriers to communication", which function to heighten the social 
and political relevance of national cleavages, while lowering the salience of sub-national and 
extra-national commitments.
33
  Deutsch correctly recognized that the production of compliance 
in modern states, even in highly authoritarian settings, relied extensively on the use of 
communication to produce voluntary attachments.
34
  In this way, modern, national states — 
those which arose over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries — represented a fundamental 
shift in the "technology of statecraft" through which states secured the loyalties of their those 
living within their boundaries.
35
  As Snyder notes, prior to this period "it hardly mattered that 
monarchs and subjects often spoke different languages and lacked a common national identity," 
as states and would-be states competed primarily on the grounds of material resource extraction 
                                                 
33 Deutsch 1953, 22. 
34 Deutsch 1953; 1966.  See also Mann 1986. 





  However, by the late 18th century, states were coming to rely 
increasingly on the generation of influence through the mass production of political loyalties; 
that is, through the production of a widespread willingness to fight and die for an imagined 
nation.
37
    
 It is no coincidence that this transition began at precisely the same historical moment that 
the development of cheap commercial printing technologies and long distance trade routes were 
fundamentally altering the costs of engaging in mass communication on a truly national scale.  
Snyder claims that the particular bundle of ideas which came to be labeled "nationalism," rose to 
ascendance at this moment because such fundamental technological shifts led it to become a 
newly "valuable commodity in the marketplace of ideas."
38
  That is, he argues that shifts in 
technology —  especially communication technology —  were important, not because they 
altered ideas directly, but because they altered the structural forces operating on the competitive 
production and dissemination of ideas by political actors.  In applying the logic of the 
"marketplace" to the realm of normative ideas, Snyder thus recognized that while normative 
influence is always subject to contestation by a diverse array of actors, there are nevertheless 
strong patterns that can be observed in aggregate behavior; patterns generated by the incentives 
facing competing producers of symbolic attachments. 
 Following in the footsteps of this structural logic, I argue that the introduction and 
expansion of technologies of mass communication — e.g. television, radio, and newsprint — can 
be expected to inhibit the mobilization of violent challenges to state sovereignty by increasing 
the ease with which collective loyalties can be constituted on a national scale.  In other words, I 
                                                 
36 Snyder 2000, 46. 
37 Anderson 1991; Mann 1986.  
38 Snyder 2000, 46.  Along similar lines, see Price 1995; 2002, describing political competition as a "market for loyalties." 
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propose that mass media technologies facilitate the maintenance of stability and sovereignty by 
altering the structural forces operating on the production and dissemination of normative appeals 
to national unity and state loyalty.  More specifically, I claim that mass media technologies 
enhance the production of normative political influence by states in two key ways: (1) by 
lowering costs of production, and (2) by strengthening economies of scale.  I will examine each 
in turn. 
 To fix ideas, suppose that state influence, I, is generated through a two-input production 
function, which combines efforts devoted to mechanisms of material influence, M, and efforts 
devoted to mechanisms of normative influence, N: 
       
The Cobb-Douglas functional form captures the assumption that these two technologies of 
influence are mutually reinforcing, and that neither can be effective if the other is completely 
absent, while the   and   parameters govern the responsiveness of the influence production 
function to increases in M and N respectively.  In economics, it is generally assumed that most 
production technologies will be characterized by declining marginal returns, i.e.      , 
meaning that each additional unit of effort devoted to a particular technology will generate less 
output than the previous unit.  Let us suppose further that the state has some finite level of effort, 
E, that represents the maximum quantity of resources that it can devote to the production of 
influence.  This implies that the state faces a "budget constraint", of the form: 
          
where    and    represent respectively the relative "costs" of each additional unit of "effort" 
devoted to material and normative technologies of influence.   
13 
 
 To see how the generation of influence through domestic soft power would be impacted 
by the introduction of mass media technologies, consider first the effects of expanding mass 
media accessibility on the production costs of normative influence,   .  As was noted above, 
normative influence necessarily occurs through acts of communication; that is, through repeated 
instances of exposure to images, narratives, and other symbols that highlight particular 
dimensions of a situation rather than others, and thereby incline actors to define emotion-laden 
categories — i.e. "right" versus "wrong" or "us" versus "them" — in ways that are congruent 
with the interests of the influencer.  As rates of mass media receivership increase within a 
society, the most basic political impact thus concerns the sheer reproducibility of political 
messages and symbols.  In the absence of mass media infrastructure, political leaders and would-
be leaders must physically travel to numerous small-scale venues to disseminate their political 
messages.  In contrast, with thousands of flickering screens dotting the hinterland, or thousands 
of newspapers dotting city corners, each instance of state authority-making can be instantly and 
effortlessly reproduced for thousands of citizens in far flung corners of the country.
39
  Whatever 
the nature of such communicative influence, there can be little doubt that it would be increased 
by greater rates of dissemination.  With each new television watcher, radio listener, or newspaper 
reader that is added to the network, the per-unit cost,   , of producing each individual-level 
instance of normative influence is thus necessarily decreased.  In other words, we should expect 
that mass media technologies will lower the production costs of domestic soft power.   
 Taken alone, this principle may at first glance appear to be a sufficient justification for 
the expectation that mass media technologies would produce barriers to insurgent mobilization.  
If normative influence can be produced at lower cost, then the quantity of normative influence 
                                                 
39 See Briggs and Burke 2002. 
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produced by the state should increase, and the likelihood of effective challenges to state 
sovereignty should decrease.  However, it is important to remember that in arenas characterized 
by political conflict, this process of normative influence is necessarily rife with competition and 
rivalry: 
"Because no political community is simply natural and all are products of 
contestation and compromises, the politics of people-making, involving both 
force and stories, is always an ongoing as well as competitive politics, even 
within apparently well-established and unified political communities. ... Inside 
and outside every political community, in rival political parties, in civil 





As Smith reminds us, political ideas do not arise of their own volition, nor do they do so in 
isolation.  They are deployed strategically by both leaders and would-be leaders, who use 
images, narratives, and other symbols to encourage recipients to jointly imagine themselves as 
members of an abstract collective, and thereby convince them of the legitimacy of the joint 
sacrifices they make on that basis.  
 In the production of political loyalties, states thus face a wide variety of challengers.  
Rather than a single "firm" (i.e. the state) simply seeking to maximize its production of 
influence, we instead find a complex ecology of rival producers, promoting a wide diversity of 
normative agendas.  Given the competitive nature of this environment, the aggregate effects of a 
decrease in the cost of normative influence are less clear than they appear at first glance.  In 
principle, such a decrease in cost could benefit the production of anti-state messages just as much 
as it benefits the production of pro-state messages.  Especially in a context of contested 
sovereignty, in which insurgents can be expected to utilize mass media technologies to 
disseminate normative appeals that contradict those issued by the state, we would therefore have 
                                                 
40 Smith 2003, 53. 
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no reason to expect that a decrease in    would increase the "market share" of the state's 
production of influence, relative to the influence of its challengers.  
 Why then, would a strong mass media system aid the state more than its competitors?  
The answer lies in what could be called the "second-order" effects of mass media technologies.  
Consider Anderson's claim that the "unified fields of exchange and communication" made 




 centuries, were "the embryo of the 
nationally imagined community".
41
  He argues that the invention of the world's first mass 
communication technology facilitated the production of national loyalties, not simply because of 
an increased ease of message dissemination, but rather because the daily consumption of 
normative political messages through such media represented an "extraordinary mass ceremony," 
in which "each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated 
simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others."
42
  Mass communication technologies thus 
make it possible for a mass audience to be addressed collectively, thereby offering the nation "an 
image of itself … as a knowable community."43 
 Anderson recognized that because the national community is composed of thousands or 
millions of members whom a given individual will never have the opportunity to meet face-to-
face, it is only through the collective nature of such mass rituals that widely dispersed individuals 
could be brought to congruent notions of their shared identities and values.  In other words, as 
has been shown repeatedly in experimental work in social psychology, political messages tend to 
achieve greater normative impacts when they are perceived to have been more widely 
                                                 
41 Anderson 1991, 44. 
42 Anderson 1991, 35. 
43 Morley 1995, 66. Chayko 2002 refers to this as a "community of the mind."  Many others have also argued for the nationally unifying effects of 





   Indeed, this is precisely why mass media technologies -- such as newspapers, 
radios, and televisions -- represent such powerful vehicles for normative influence.
45
  The 
synchronized and public nature of mass communication technologies allow leaders to convert 
nationalist images, narratives, and symbols into elements of "common knowledge," which are 
known by all to have been seen by all, and which thereby achieve even greater normative 
impact.
46
  This positive interdependence in the reception of normative appeals implies that the 
symbolic capacities generated by mass media technologies will be subject to increasing marginal 
returns, as every additional recipient added to the network increases the medium's potential 
impactfulness for all other recipients.
47
  That is, we should expect that mass media technologies 
will strengthen economies of scale in the production of normative influence.   
 In terms of the expressions given above, this means that expanded access to mass media 
infrastructure will be associated, not only with a reduction in the per-unit cost of normative 
influence,   , but also with an increase in the returns-to-scale of normative influence, such that 
   .   In other words, mass media technologies make it possible for each additional unit of 
effort devoted to normative influence to generate greater output than the previous unit, to a 
degree that increases with the density of mass media reception.  This means that as mass media 
access expands within a society, large-scale producers of normative influence (i.e. states) will be 
increasingly favored in their competition with small-scale producers (i.e. would-be states).
 48
  
This second-order strengthening of the technologies of normative influence also implies that 
strong mass media systems, because they can reach a greater proportion of the population, will 
                                                 
44 Mutz 2001; Chwe 1998. 
45 Zaller 1992. 
46 See Chwe 2001. 
47 In economic terms, we might say that normative influence through mass media technologies is subject to "positive consumption externalities." 
See Katz and Shapiro 1985.  
48 See Katz and Shapiro 1985 for an analysis of the competitive equilibria that arise in the context of the increasing returns-to-scale of mass media 
technologies.  See Norton and Norton 1986 for empirical evidence that newspaper production is characterized by positive economies of scale.   
For an analysis of the importance of increasing returns in political competition, see Pierson 2000. 
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generate more powerful incentives for the production of normative appeals that are capable of 
achieving widespread popular acceptance.  Mass media technologies thus function to tilt the 
normative playing field in favor of broad claims to national unity and state loyalty.  As a result, 
even in a competitive context characterized numerous potential challengers to state authority, 
states will be increasingly be favored over their challengers in the production of normative 
influence.   
 Taken together, these two principles — decreased costs of production and increased 
economies of scale — thus imply that basic patterns of political conflict will be strongly 
conditioned by cross-national variation in the strength of mass media systems.  In particular, 
because mass media systems which reach a greater proportion of the population can be expected 
to lower production costs and strengthen economies of scale in the generation of normative 
influence, I argue that we should also expect such systems to facilitate the maintenance of state 
sovereignty and stability.  By focusing attention on the causal effects of variation in mass 
communication infrastructure, I seek to show that state power can be enhanced by a factor whose 
presence is easily measurable and quantifiable, but whose effects could only originate in non-
material mechanisms.
49
  TV screens cannot transmit bullets, and they cannot transmit dollars; 
they can only transmit symbols.  Mass media technologies thus offer an opportunity cleanly 
isolate the generation of soft power through voluntary communication. 
 Moreover, by focusing on civil war as the outcome of interest, I seek to position the 
analysis in what many would consider a 'difficult' arena for the demonstration of the causal 
effects of 'mere' communication.  In doing so, I seek to show that the effects of soft power are 
not simply a matter of cultural window dressing, and that patterns of communication exercise 
                                                 
49 For an incisive analysis of "social" influence processes in civil conflict, see Wood 2003; 2008. 
18 
 
enormously powerful effects even in the context of a life-or-death struggle for state existence.  
Patterns of communication are, in other words, central to patterns of human security.  
Furthermore, the focus on civil war allows me to side-step what would otherwise be a thorny 
empirical issue: the problem of identifying what counts as "success" in production of state 
influence.  Because the desire to not be challenged militarily is universal to all states, the 
outbreak of civil war represents an unambiguous signal that a state lacks the capacity to satisfy 
even its most basic desires for compliance.  It is therefore an ideal empirical indicator of the 
failure of state power. 
 The theoretical discussion above implies that states with high levels of mass media 
accessibility will be more effective producers of normative influence — i.e. soft power — 
relative to their challengers, and will therefore be less likely to experience the emergence of 
effective militarized challenges to state sovereignty.  Civil warfare should, in other words, be 
seen as a form of collective action which is structurally facilitated not only by material weakness 
on the part of the state, but also by symbolic weakness.  This leads directly to our main 
hypothesis:  
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, states with high levels of media accessibility will be less likely to 
experience the onset of civil war.   
 
 Of course, it will not have escaped the notice of some readers that the perspective 
advanced here stands at odds with the claims generally found in recent qualitative work on the 
relationship between mass communication and collective violence.  Examinations of hateful and 
inflammatory mass media messages in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere have repeatedly 
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found that discourses of ethnification fanned the flames of divisive nationalist sentiments that 
became the rallying cries for all variety of barbarous massacres and the bloody deaths of 
thousands of civilians.
50
  Such analyses have convinced many that the mass media should be 
viewed as one of the primary culprits in fomenting inter-group divisions and animosities.
51
  The 
problem is that these conclusions have generally rested on questionable evidentiary foundations.  
Because they have essentially selected their cases on the dependent variable, these studies of the 
relationship between mass media and mass violence only observe mass communication behavior 
in those countries which are experiencing the outbreak of large-scale civil conflict.  It should 
hardly be surprising that in the midst of brutal civil wars the mass media have frequently been 
observed to transmit inflammatory messages.  However, this observation does not constitute 
evidence that mass media systems are generally inclined to the promotion of collective violence, 
nor does it give us any insight into the factors which allow some countries to avoid the outbreak 
of such conflict in the first place.  In the following section, I will show that expanding our focus 
to the full universe of cases reveals quite a different picture.  In fact, consistent with the theory of 
normative influence presented above, this macro-level evidence demonstrates that mass media 
technologies represent some of the most powerful forces for peace and stability yet observed in 
the modern world. 
 
Data & Methods 
 To subject this conjecture to empirical scrutiny, I compiled data on mass media 
transmission capabilities in 173 countries for the period 1945-1999.  To capture the concept of 
                                                 
50 Des Forges 1999; Metzl 1997; Miloševic, 1997; Gagnon 1994/95; Thompson 1994; Brass 1997; Tambiah 1997. 
51 Important exceptions to this general trend include work by Kern and Hainmueller 2009 showing that spill-over transmissions from West 
Germany into East Germany tended to bolster approval of the East German regime, Straus 2007 showing that radio signals in Rwanda were too 
weak to be a likely cause of the majority of the violence, and Paluck's 2009 field experiments in Rwanda showing that mass media messages can 
act to reduce intergroup prejudice. 
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variability in rates of mass media accessibility across societies, I construct the Media Density 
Index (MDI) on a country-year basis as follows: 
      
                        
            
     
where      is equal to the number of television receivers in use for broadcasts to the general 
public in each country-year,         is equal to the number of radio receivers in use for 
broadcasts to the general public,             is equal to the circulation of daily newspapers 
(those published at least four times a week), and              is equal to the country's total 
population.
52
 These three technologies represent the most powerful vehicles for the mass 
production of political messages available to states in the post-World War II period,
53
 and thus 
together serve as the ideal measure of variation in state capacities to produce soft power.   
 By examining variation in this quantity on a global basis, it becomes possible to observe 
the tremendously unrepresentative nature of the cases that have been referenced most frequently 
in the literature on mass media and mass violence.  Figure 1 shows a kernel density plot of the 
cross-national distribution of the Media Density Index as of 1989, shortly before the outbreak of 
civil war in Yugoslavia.  As can clearly be seen, Yugoslavia's value of 40.2 is well below the 
global average of 61.3 (shown by the dashed line) for this period.  Rwanda's value of 6.7 is even 
lower, placing it amongst the very weakest states in the system.  We should therefore not be 
surprised that these countries were unable to maintain internal peace and stability, and we should 
also not be surprised that the normative messages which came to dominate under these 
                                                 
52 The data for the MDI, in addition to the data on telephones, literacy, and education discussed below, are taken from the Banks (2002) Cross-
National Times Series database and the World Bank’s (2004) World Development Indicators database.  In the case of disagreements between the 
two sources, the Banks data was generally prioritized, except for a small number of obvious typos.  Missing values were linearly interpolated (but 
not extrapolated) within a given time series.  The interpolated values represent less than 2% of the observations, and excluding them from the 
estimations reported below does not substantively alter the results.  Note that while mass media reception rates in individual countries would 
more ideally be captured through nationally representative individual or household surveys, such data is not available on a global basis for the 
time period covered in this study.  Moreover, the data sources used to construct the MDI have the added advantage of relying on physically 
observable quantities rather than subjective reports. 
53 Briggs and Burke 2002; Mughan and Gunther 2000. 
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circumstances trended strongly towards vitriol and division.  Indeed, this is precisely the pattern 
of political communication that the theory articulated above would lead us to expect in contexts 
characterized by the weakness of mass media technologies.
54
  
 Such observations clearly demonstrate the need for a global analysis of the relationship 
between variation in mass media strength and the probability of experiencing militarized 
challenges to state authority.  The results reported below are based on logistic regressions, using 
Huber/White robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country.  The dependent variable, 
Civil War Onset, equals 1 for all country-years in which a civil war started and 0 for all others.  
Following Sambanis, a civil war is defined as an armed challenge to state sovereignty in which 
the combatants have publicly stated political objectives, recruits are drawn from the local 
population, and the fighting causes at least 500 deaths in the first year or 1,000 deaths in the first 
three years.
55
  This yields a list of 138 civil war onsets for the period 1945-1999. 
In addition our main independent variable, the Media Density Index, several control 
variables are included in the analysis, all of which have figured prominently in the literature on 
civil war.
56
  GDP per capita measures a country’s level of economic development and wealth.  
Land Area
57
, Population, and Mountainous Terrain are included as measures of the difficulties 
faced by governments seeking to control large populations across broad and difficult terrain.  As 
in most previously reported models, these variables are log-transformed because they are 
expected to have diminishing marginal effects as they grow larger.
58
 Oil Exporter is a 
dichotomous indicator which equals 1 if a country derives at least one-third of its export 
revenues from fossil fuels.  Democracy is measured using the standard 21-point scale derived 
                                                 
54 See Snyder 2000 and Snyder and Ballentine 1996 for trenchant analyses of such dynamics in democratizing states. 
55 Sambanis 2004. 
56 Unless otherwise noted, data for the control variables were taken from Fearon and Laitin 2003 and Sambanis 2004. 
57 Data taken from Banks 2002. 
58 See Fearon and Laitin 2003 and Sambanis 2004. 
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 is included to capture the "inverted-U" 
relationship found in some previous studies.  Finally, Ethnic Fractionalization and Religious 
Fractionalization are included to control for the presence of pre-existing identity cleavages in 
the society.  As a check against the potential bias produced by duration dependence I also 
include Peace Years, which measures the number of years since the last civil war onset in a 
particular country, along with a natural cubic spline of peace years.
60
  To guard against spurious 
results due to reverse causation, all independent variables are lagged by one year. 
 
Main Results 
 The results from the main models are reported in Table 1.  Model 1 is a baseline 
specification with control variables, including GDP per capita, drawn from the previous 
literature.  Model 2 removes the GDP variable while adding the Media Density Index to the 
baseline specification.  Model 3 presents the combined specification, with both GDP per capita 
and the Media Density Index included in a single model.  The evidence drawn from these models 
is strongly supportive of Hypothesis 1.  The coefficient for the Media Density Index is negative 
and statistically significant (p < 0.001), indicating that higher levels of mass media accessibility 
are generally associated with lower probabilities of civil war onset.  In addition to being 
statistically significant, the Media Density Index is also quite significant in substantive terms.  
Holding all other variables constant at their means, a shift from the 5
th
 percentile to the 95
th
 
percentile of the Media Density Index results in more than a tenfold decrease in the probability 
that a country will experience a civil war, moving from a yearly onset probability of 3.1% to a 
                                                 
59 The scale results from subtracting the Polity IV Autocracy score from the Democracy score.  The scale is transformed to range from 1 to 21 
(rather than –10 to 10) to ease interpretation of the coefficients. 
60 As per the recommendations of Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998.  Note that the results are equivalent if we instead use polynomials of peace years, 





  As can be seen more clearly in Figure 2, the magnitude of this effect 
outstrips the substantive impacts of every other statistically significant variable in the model.  
It is also interesting to note that once we add the Media Density Index to the combined 
model specification, the apparent impact of GDP per capita is reduced substantially, and ceases 
to be statistically significant. This is quite surprising, as the finding that wealthy countries — 
those with strong material capabilities — are less likely to experience civil war is one of the few 
results that has been consistent across multiple authors and specifications throughout the civil 
conflict literature.
62
  At first glance, it seems plausible that this finding is simply an artifact of 
multicollinearity, but there are several reasons to reject that explanation.  First, while GDP per 
capita is certainly correlated with the Media Density Index, if we compare Model 1 to Model 3 
we see that the standard error of the GDP per capita coefficient actually shrinks when the Media 
Density Index is added to the model, rather than expanding as we would expect if 
multicollinearity were the culprit.
63
 
Second, if mass media accessibility is simply serving as a (presumably noisy) proxy for 
the material capabilities produced by high levels of economic development, then the information 
contained in the Media Density Index should provide no additional predictive leverage in 
selecting country-years which are likely to experience the onset of civil war.  To test this 
conjecture, I generate Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for Models 1, 2, and 3 
(see Figure 3).  The area under each curve, the AUC statistic, represents a measure of the overall 
predictive accuracy of each model.
64
 Hence the difference between two AUC statistics can be 
                                                 
61 All predicted probabilities were calculated using Tomz, Wittenberg, and King’s Clarify software.  For details, see Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 
2001 and King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000. 
62 Sambanis 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006. 
63 Moreover, a Variance Inflation Factor of 3.74 indicates that this result is not likely to be driven by multicollinearity. 
64 See Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke 2010 for an application of AUC statistics to the prediction of civil conflict. 
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Comparing Model 1 to Model 2 reveals that when the Media Density Index strongly 
outperforms GDP per capita as a predictor of civil war onset (p = 0.012).  Moreover, comparing 
Model 1 to Model 3 reveals that even once the information contained in the GDP per capita 
variable is known, statistically significant increases in predictive accuracy can be gained by 
adding the Media Density Index to the specification (p = 0.031).  However, comparing Model 2 
to Model 3 reveals that the reverse is not the case: once the information contained in the Media 
Density Index is known, no statistically significant increase in predictive accuracy can be gained 
by adding GDP per capita to the specification (p = 0.856).  This asymmetry of predictive success 
is important for two reasons.  First, if on purely instrumentalist grounds one cared only about 
accurately predicting which country-years were likely to experience the onset of civil war, then 
the results indicate that one should always prefer to make such predictions on the basis of mass 
media density rather than aggregate levels of economic development.  Second, the results 
demonstrate that while these two indicators are partially correlated, the predictive successes 
achieved by the Media Density Index cannot be attributed to the effects of economic 
development, and that mass media is likely to be the more proximate cause of the observed 
reduction in civil war likelihood. 
 
                                                 
65 The p-values reported in the text for the differences in AUC statistics are generated using the method proposed by Delong et al. (1988), which 
corrects for the fact that the competing models are correlated, because they were generated using the same data.  However, the use of AUC 
statistics as a measure of differences in predictive accuracy has also been criticized by some authors, especially because AUC statistics are rank-
based, and thus blind to many differences in discrimination that arise from variation in the absolute magnitude of predicted probabilities.  To 
address such concerns, Pencina et al. (2007) propose a measure of Integrated Discrimination Improvement (IDI), which is analogous to AUC 
statistics, but which is also sensitive to differences in discrimination, because it is derived from differences in the magnitude of predicted 
probabilities of events, rather than differences in the rank-order of the probabilities of events.  Using this approach, the results reported in the text 
are each confirmed with a higher degree of statistical significance: Model 2 outperforms Model 1 (p = 0.0002); Model 3 outperforms Model 1 (p 




However, given such correlations, one might still suspect that the Media Density Index is 
simply serving as a proxy for the aggregate effects of modernization, whether through the 
provision of greater levels of personal wealth and life satisfaction,
66
 or through the creation of an 
informed citizenry that can hold its government accountable.
67
  In contrast, the theoretical 
framework advanced here explicitly claims that the unifying effects of mass media strength are 
due not to the forces of material wealth, or to the production of accurate knowledge amongst the 
citizenry, but rather to reduced costs and increased economies of scale in the production of 
normative influence. To examine this claim more closely, Models 4-7 add measures for aspects 
of modernization which are associated with broader advances in material well-being and 
knowledge, but which, unlike mass media technologies, do not generate economies of scale in 
the production of normative influence.  Model 4 adds a count of the number of telephone lines 
per capita; Model 5 adds a measure of per capita adult literacy rates; Model 6 adds the per capita 
enrollment in secondary schools.
68
  Finally, Model 7 adds a dichotomous indicator of Media 
Freedom coded as 1 for any country-year in which the mass media were free from content 
restrictions or censorship on the part of the state.
69
  The results are again reported in Table 1.  
None of newly added variables reach conventional levels of statistical significance, and their 
addition to Model 3 does nothing to reduce the statistical or substantive significance of the 
Media Density Index.  In addition to demonstrating that aggregate increases in modernization and 
knowledge have no discernable effect on the probability of civil warfare, these results also 
                                                 
66 Inglehart 1997; Thyne 2006. 
67 Gentzkow and Shapiro.  2006; Hallin and Mancini 2004; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Slantchev 2006. 
68 Data for Models 4-6 are taken from Banks 2002 and World Bank 2004.  See fn. 52.  
69 Coded by the author using the Freedom House Press Freedom Survey 2005 and Van Belle’s 1997 press freedom data.  The variable equals one 
when the state is coded in the top category of press freedom in either source. Disagreements between these two sources were resolved by 
privileging whichever indicator represented a greater level of censorship, as errors of omission (i.e. failing to see censorship that actually exists) 
were thought to be more likely than errors of commission (i.e. seeing censorship when none actually exists). 
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provide additional confirmation that the Media Density Index is not simply serving as a proxy for 
the presence of a more educated or more technologically advanced society, nor is it serving as a 
proxy for the freedom of information.  Rather, this evidence indicates that is specifically mass 
media technologies, and their ability to generate economies of scale in the production of 
normative influence, that are responsible for the observed decrease in the probability of civil war 
onset. 
Still, many have argued that the effects of mass media lie primarily in the provision of 
information, and that mass media's influence will therefore be felt most strongly in the presence 
of high levels of media freedom.
70
  In other words, it could be the case that while media freedom 
has no direct impact on the probability of civil war, it nevertheless conditions the effectiveness of 
mass media density.  To investigate this possibility, I split the observed country-years into two 
categories: those where Media Freedom = 0, and those where Media Freedom = 1, and then ran 
separate regressions on each sub-sample with the full set of control variables from Model 3.  The 
results indicate that the Media Density Index exercises significant and substantial effects under 
both conditions (p = 0.02 and p = 0.04, respectively), and that there is no statistically significant 
difference in the magnitude of effects across the conditions (p = 0.742).  In other words, the 
results indicate that mass media density continues to generate domestically pacifying effects, 
even in the face of state censorship.  To ensure that this result is not an artifact of the coding 
procedure used to generate the Media Freedom variable, I conduct the same split-sample 
exercise by dividing the observations into those that are above and below the global median level 
of Democracy.  The results are unchanged: the Media Density Index exercises significant and 
                                                 
70 Djankov et al. 2003; Van Belle 1996. 
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substantial effects under both conditions (p = 0.01 and p = 0.02, respectively), and there is no 
statistically significant difference in the magnitude of effects across the conditions (p = 0.893). 
Hence, whatever mechanism is responsible for the pacifying effects of mass media 
density must be operating in both democratic and authoritarian contexts.  While at first glance 
this may seem surprising, it is precisely the pattern we would expect to see if the effects of mass 
media technology occur through the generation of economies of scale in the production of 
normative influence.  As Snyder reminds us,  
"Not all successful modern states are democracies, but with very few exceptions, 





It is thus important to remember that politics of normative influence are not confined to liberal, 
democratic settings.  While states have adopted widely varying "idioms" of statehood
72
 — that 
is, the categories and principles through which the right to rule is constituted — nearly all rely on 
the generation of voluntary compliance through the production of some form of normative 
influence, and therefore benefit from an increase in the ease with which such influence can be 
produced.  As a result, the basic dynamics of competition, cost, and scale described above can be 
expected to arise under both democratic and authoritarian institutional structures. 
A similar split-sample exercise also allows us to investigate the claims referenced above, 
concerning the apparent role of mass media in stoking the flames of ethnic hatred.  That is, 
perhaps the broadly pacifying effects of mass media technology have a tendency to break down 
in the face of divisive demographic cleavages.  To investigate this possibility, I first form sub-
samples above and below the median level of Ethnic Fractionalization, then form sub-samples 
above and below the median level of Religious Fractionalization, and then run separate 
                                                 
71 Snyder 2000, 46. 
72 Scott 2009. 
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regressions on each sub-sample as before.  Regardless of which index of demographic diversity 
is used, the results are the same: the Media Density Index exercises significant and substantial 
pacifying effects under both conditions (p-values ranging from 0.01 to 0.03), and there is no 
statistically significant difference in the magnitude of effects across the conditions (p = 0.681 
and p = 0.452, respectively).  In other words, when viewed from a global perspective, there is no 
evidence that mass media systems are generally inclined to the promotion of collective violence, 
even in the face of preexisting ethnic divisions.  The apparent relationship between mass media 
and ethnic violence noted in previous studies thus appears to be spurious; a flawed inference 
arising from a tendency to focus on a small number of unrepresentative cases — Yugoslavia and 




 To ensure that these results are robust to alternative statistical specifications Model 3 was 
re-estimated, first using a rare events logit estimator, second using a population-averaged GEE 
estimator with an AR(1) error correlation structure, and finally using a fixed-effects 
specification.  In each case, the results are substantively identical to those reported in Model 3, 
so I omit them here in the interest of space.
73
  I also tested the individual components of the 
Media Density Index in separate models, and found them to each be statistically significant: 
Radio Density (p < 0.001), Television Density (p = 0.03), and Newspaper Density (p = 0.01), 
with similar substantive effect magnitudes to those found for each unit increase of the Media 
Density Index.  Additional models utilized alternative indicators of democracy from Vreeland
74
 
                                                 
73 See Online Appendix for full results. 
74 Vreeland 2008. 
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and Gates et al. 2006.
75
  These models reproduce the apparent absence of a direct effect of 
regime type on the probability of civil war found by these authors, but otherwise are 
substantively equivalent to the models reported in Table 1. 
 Nevertheless, it is well-known that such statistical results can change dramatically when 
different combinations of independent variables are included in the model.  Unfortunately, if 
there are a total of n independent variables, then there are 2
n
 possible model configurations.  
Traditional regression analysis leaves the reader with no means for determining whether the 
presented models are actually reflective of this universe of potential model specifications, or 
whether they were cherry-picked to reflect the analyst’s theoretical expectations.  A recently 
developed solution to this difficulty, known as Bayesian model averaging (BMA), averages over 
a variety of potential model specifications to generate a posterior distribution of the likelihood 
that each parameter will be non-zero in the best model specifications.
76
  Here, model 
probabilities are judged using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) prior.  Following the 
advice of Montgomery and Nyhan,
77
 I allow the BMA algorithm to search the entire space of 
potential model configurations using the full set of independent variables from Table 1, with the 
only restriction being that the three cubic splines must enter or leave the specification as a group.  
This generates a search space of 65,536 potential model specifications.   
The results, presented graphically in Figure 4, show the posterior probability of inclusion 
–  i.e.   (   ) – for each independent variable.  The differences between the Media Density 
Index and the other indicators of material wealth and modernization could not be more stark. The 
Media Density Index achieves the highest inclusion probabilities of any of the variables 
                                                 
75 Gates et al. 2006. 
76 Bartels 1997.  For a comprehensive review, see Clyde and George 2004. 
77 Montgomery and Nyhan 2010. 
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considered,  99.5%, followed closely by Population at 99.0%, Religious Fractionalization at 
94.1%, and Mountainous Terrain at 91.6% .  In contrast, GDP per capita fails to even cross the 
50% threshold.  The other modernization indicators, Telephones, Secondary Education, Literacy, 
Years Since Independence, and Media Freedom do not fare much better, with posterior inclusion 
probabilities ranging from 29.5% to 62.4%.  This provides further evidence that the statistical 
and substantive significance of the Media Density Index in the models reported above is neither a 
result of convenient specification choices, nor a simple artifact of collinearity between various 
indicators of economic advancement, but rather a result of the Media Density Index's remarkably 
robust ability to predict the onset of civil war.   
Still, the framework of Bayesian model averaging, as with all regression-based 
techniques, necessarily incorporates a number of functional form assumptions, particularly 
assumptions of linear and independent effects, which could easily be violated in our sample.  As 
a final check of the robustness of the relationship, I therefore use an optimized matching 
estimator, which due to its nonparametric form, avoids the need for functional form assumptions 
altogether, while ensuring that any observable factors which might have caused certain countries 
to be selected into high levels of mass media density are accounted for in the estimation of causal 
effects of mass media technologies.  To estimate this causal effect, I first dichotomize the Media 
Density Index by assigning a 1 to all observations greater than the global mean, and a 0 to all 
others.  To achieve optimal balance amongst the covariates, I then rely on an evolutionary search 
algorithm known as "genetic matching," which produces optimally balanced samples by 
searching over a vector of parameterized weights that are applied to each of the covariates and to 
aggregate propensity score, and finding the set of weights that, when used to draw treatment and 
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control groups, minimizes the maximum imbalance amongst the full set of covariates.
78
  This 
procedure estimates an average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of -0.424 for the high-
density treatment condition, which is strongly statistically significant (p < 0.001).  In contrast, 
the same procedure yields small (-0.031) and insignificant (p = 0.759) estimate of the effect of 
GDP per capita. The clear implication is that mass media strength is the proximate cause of the 
reduction in civil war likelihood that in previous analyses had been attributed to the material 
effects of aggregate levels of economic development.   
However, such results should not be taken imply that material forces are unimportant to 
the generation and suppression of civil conflict.  Rather, they indicate that GDP per capita is a 
poor indicator of those forces, because it suffers from excessive aggregation.  As a broad 
measure of economic development, this indicator inevitably serves as a proxy for numerous 
dimensions of state strength, of both the "hard" and "soft" varieties.  The key advantage of the 
Media Density Index is that it is more narrowly construed, and thus allows us to cleanly isolate 
the pacifying effects of soft power.  The fact that GDP per capita ceases to be statistically 
significant once we account for this soft power dimension does not necessarily imply that hard 
power exercises no effects, but rather that future demonstrations of the utility of hard power will 
have to rely on more narrowly construed empirical indicators.   
 
Conclusion 
Taken together, the results presented here demonstrate that the pacifying effect of mass 
media technology is one of the most robust empirical relationships yet discovered in the 
                                                 
78 Diamond and Sekhon 2010.  The algorithm assesses balance between treatment and control groups using paired t-tests for the dichotomous 
covariates and univariate bootstrap Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the continuous covariates.  After the matching procedure, these same tests 
indicated that none of the covariates had statistically significant differences in their distributions between the treatment and control groups. 
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quantitative study of civil war.  In making this demonstration, I also hope to have shown that 
there is no necessary opposition between constructivist theory and quantitative methods.
79
  On 
the contrary, by applying a structural empirical approach to constructivist theoretical concepts, 
this analysis has sought to provide rigorous, systematic evidence for the fundamental importance 
of non-material state capacities.  This evidence makes clear that the mechanisms available to 
states for the production of influence extend far beyond the material forces of coercion and 
payment.  States also rely on the normative influence of mass communication to induce 
voluntary compliance with state dictates.  The results thus demonstrate that patterns of political 
communication —  i.e. soft power —  play a central role in the production of human security, 
even in the life-or-death context of militarized challenges to state sovereignty. 
Of course, communication technologies are constantly evolving, and we should therefore 
be wary of assuming that today's rules will continue to operate in tomorrow's world.  As new 
technological innovations arise, states and their challengers must constantly adapt their tactics, 
developing new modes of contestation as they seek advantage in an ever-changing 
communicative environment.  New forms of communication technology can thus be expected to 
generate new patterns of political conflict.  For instance, while the centralized "mass" 
communication technologies that formed the focus of this analysis have generally functioned to 
the advantage of states over their challengers, it is far from clear that the same will be true of the 
internet, cell phones, and other forms of "social" media, which instead facilitate decentralized 
horizontal connections between individuals.  The results presented here should therefore 
certainly not be taken to imply that all forms of communication technology will necessarily have 
pacifying effects, or that technological contexts of the 20th century are likely to remain 
                                                 
79 See Fearon and Wendt 2002; Farrell and Finnemore 2009. 
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unchanged in the 21st century.  Rather, they serve as a demonstration of the fundamental 
inadequacy of approaches to state strength that focus exclusively on hard power resources, while 
ignoring the role of normative communication in the production of voluntary compliance.  They 










Table 1: Logit Regressions - Civil War Onset 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Media Density Index 
  
-0.0230*** -0.0259*** -0.0268*** -0.0251*** -0.0327*** -0.0231*** 
  
  
(0.0049) (0.0066) (0.0082) (0.0076) (0.0079) (0.0064) 




-0.0039 -0.0078 0.0042 0.0155 -0.0064 
  
 
(0.0627) (0.0446) (0.0515) (0.0397) (0.0351) (0.0464) 
Area 
 
-0.0840 -0.0983 -0.0908 -0.0906 -0.1151 -0.0749 -0.1294 
  
 
(0.0789) (0.0844) (0.0893) (0.0894) (0.0917) (0.0924) (0.0948) 
Mountainous Terrain 
 
0.1405*** 0.1073** 0.1054** 0.1045** 0.1102** 0.1428*** 0.1156** 
  
 
(0.0496) (0.0480) (0.0487) (0.0491) (0.0503) (0.0493) (0.0519) 
Population 
 
0.2311*** 0.2831*** 0.2834*** 0.2842*** 0.3027*** 0.2738*** 0.3028*** 
  
 
(0.0723) (0.0723) (0.0746) (0.0752) (0.0796) (0.0804) (0.0789) 
Oil Exporter 
 
0.8290*** 0.7006*** 0.7335*** 0.7427*** 0.7341*** 0.6799*** 0.7634*** 
  
 
(0.2174) (0.2028) (0.2184) (0.2240) (0.2204) (0.2249) (0.2338) 
Democracy 
 
0.1798** 0.2076*** 0.1782** 0.1795** 0.1827** 0.1412* 0.2029** 
  
 





-0.0078** -0.0088*** -0.0073** -0.0074** -0.0075** -0.0056* -0.0082** 
  
 
(0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0036) 
Ethnic Fract. 
 
0.4235 0.3500 0.2879 0.2812 0.3588 0.1470 0.4308 
  
 
(0.3350) (0.3362) (0.3496) (0.3537) (0.3606) (0.3543) (0.3594) 
Religious Fract. 
 
1.0780** 1.3416*** 1.3196** 1.3205** 1.4156*** 1.3217** 1.3373** 
  
 
(0.4678) (0.4864) (0.5247) (0.5238) (0.5227) (0.5609) (0.5535) 
Telephones 
    
0.0052 
   
  
















     
(0.0417) 
Media Freedom 
       
-0.3933 
  




-7.5452*** -8.3818*** -8.2773*** -8.2858*** -8.5213*** -8.2145*** -8.6526*** 
  
 
(1.0310) (1.0599) (1.0731) (1.0815) (1.0932) (1.0771) (1.1092) 
Peace Years 
 
-0.1151* -0.1013 -0.1205* -0.1200* -0.1167* -0.1436* -0.0890 
  
 
(0.0632) (0.0677) (0.0687) (0.0687) (0.0706) (0.0799) (0.0717) 
Splines(1-3) 
 
N/S N/S N/S N/S N/S N/S N/S 
  
 
       
N   6,157 6,012 5,899 5,899 5,844 5,768 5,694 
 
Note: All independent variables lagged by one year.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  N/S indicates that 
splines were included, but were not significant. 















Note: Based on coefficients and standard errors from Model 3. First differences are calculated by holding all other 
variables at their means while shifting the variable of interest from its 5th percentile to its 95th percentile. The only 
exception is for Democracy, which is shifted from a value of 1 (pure authoritarianism, which produces the lowest 
probability of civil war onset) to a value of 12 (the type of mixed regime which maximizes the probability of civil 
war onset).  Note that while the effect of the Media Density Index is negative, whereas the other effects are positive, 



















































Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to Models 1-3 from Table 1.  AUC statistics are calculated for each 
corresponding model.  The p-values test likelihood that two AUC statistics are equal, that is,  
H0: AUCi – AUCj = 0. 
 
 
p = 0.012 
Area Under Curve (AUC) 










Note: Dependent variable is Civil War Onset.  Bars represent posterior inclusion probabilities for each independent 
variable, using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) prior, and the full search space of 65,536 potential model 
specifications. 
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